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The Editorial on the Research Topic
Evolutionary Theory: Fringe or Central to Psychological Science
The computational theory of mind, which views the brain as an information processor that operates
on cognitive representations, is central to modern cognitive psychology and is the dominant
perspective fromwhich brain function is conceptualized and studied. Evolutionary Psychology (EP)
is the application of evolutionary theory to understanding human behavior and cognition. Unlike
other core Psychology topic areas (such as Personality, Learning, or Developmental Psychology),
however, EP is not defined by the subset of psychological phenomena it seeks to describe and
understand. It is instead defined by a specific meta-theoretical perspective, from which it seeks
to (potentially) explain all psychological phenomena. The central question posed by this volume
is whether this over-arching nature provides an opportunity for evolutionary approaches to offer
an alternative meta-theoretical perspective to the information processing/representational view of
brain function and behavior.
Readers of this volume will notice a sharp demarcation between descriptions of traditional
Evolutionary Psychology, which several authors (Barret et al.; Stotz; Stulp et al.) have presented as
indistinguishable from the information processing approach, and newer conceptualizations of EP.
Indeed one of the major themes running through several of the contributions (Burke; Barret et al.;
Stephen; Stotz; Stulp et al.) concerns the appropriate conceptualization of EP itself, with the Santa
Barbara school of massive modularity (made famous by John Tooby and Leda Cosmides) receiving
the most scrutiny. As Barret et al. and Stotz describe, early conceptualizations of EP embraced
the notion of massive modularity of mind. Individual modules were presumed to act as evolved
computers, sensitive to domain specific information and processing it in adaptive ways. Framed in
this manner, EP fits well within even a very strict definition of a computational theory of mind and
could hardly be seen as the source of an alternative meta-theoretical approach to understanding
brain and behavior.
It may not be appropriate, however, to view either the computational theory of mind or the
field of EP so narrowly. As Klasios argues, many evolutionary psychologists adopt a more generic
notion of computation, one that commits more to the abstract representation and manipulation of
information, rather than to digital computation in its literal sense (although see also Bryant). EP
too, is no longer wed to notions of massive modularity (Stephen), with the majority of research
in the field motivated by consideration of first principles of evolutionary theory and is neither
constrained nor informed by assumptions of massive modularity or domain specific mechanisms
(Burke). With these considerations in mind, Klasios and Bryant both argue that computation
is still the most profitable account of the mind and is able to accommodate both evolutionary
and e-cognition (extended, embodied approaches which place emphasis on the role played by
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the whole organism and its environment in the decision-
making process, rather than simply the brain) perspectives,
that favor notions of neural adaptations that are “complex,
widely distributed, and highly diffuse” (Klasios) over the
more strictly isolated mental modules supposed by massive
modularity.
Burke further argues that commitments to massive
modularity, or to either a computational, direct, or e-
cognition view of the brain, are unnecessary for evolutionary
theory to become the foundational theory of psychological
science. Presenting a series of six reasons for the current
failure of evolutionary theory to inform most research within
psychological science, Burke (with supporting arguments given
by Jonason and Dane, and Stephen), suggests that a mixture of
misunderstandings about the field of EP coupled with motivated
opposition and misguided skepticism are to blame.
If Burke’s assessment is accurate, such barriers may only be
overcome by a concerted effort to unite EP with Behavioral
Ecology and Evolutionary Biology. Stotz proposes one such
unity with her Extended Evolutionary Psychology. Combining
evolutionary theories concerning genetic, epigenetic, behavioral,
and cultural systems of inheritance, developmental plasticity
and niche construction, with e-cognition, Stotz outlines a truly
integrative EP. Stotz’ Extended Evolutionary Psychology draws
on complex mechanisms of inheritance to help understand the
evolution of psychological traits. But it also sees investigations
of e-cognition informing theories of niche construction and
transgenerational developmental plasticity. Thus, the integration
of evolutionary theory with psychology provides reciprocated
benefits to both fields.
Barrett et al.; Barrett et al. and Stulp et al. argue for an
Extended Mind Hypothesis. The Extended Mind Hypothesis sits
within an evolutionarily informed framework, but places much
emphasis on the sociocultural nature of human psychology and
the external resources (cultural and technological artifacts) that
form part of the modern human cognitive system. The Extended
Mind Hypothesis offers the various forms of e-cognition, rather
than EP, as the appropriate meta-theoretical perspective to
succeed the computational theory of mind. In arguments that
mirror those presented by Burke, however, Stephen et al.
argue that while e-cognition represents an interesting alternative
to more traditional proximal explanations of behavior (such
as computational theory of mind), behavior must still be
examined through a sophisticated evolutionary lens if an ultimate
understanding is to be reached.
Newer conceptualizations of EP are uncommitted to notions
of massive modularity, look beyond the Pleistocene for the
selection pressures that have shaped psychological mechanisms
and incorporate developmental and cultural impacts into
theories concerning the evolved functions of psychological
mechanisms. It is clear however, that the massive modularity
roots of modern EP still influence how many, including both
advocates and critics, view the field. One message that is clear
from the works presented in this volume, is that EP must
mature and free itself of many of its early assumptions and
assertions (as seems to be currently happening empirically, if not
yet theoretically, Burke). Only if this occurs, will EP be placed
to properly integrate with Evolutionary Biology and be in a
position to cement evolutionary theory as a unifying meta-theory
for Psychological Science. Whether such a New Evolutionary
Psychology should incorporate computational theories of mind
or reject these in favor of the newer e-cognition perspectives is
an empirical question and not one whose answer needs to be
decided before the weight of evidence has settled in either court
(Stephen).
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